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Abstract
Informal exchange of information among competitors has been well-documented in
a variety of industries, and one’s expectation of reciprocity shown to be a key deter-
minant. We use an indeterminate horizon centipede game to establish a feedback loop
in the laboratory and show that an individual’s beliefs about the recipient’s intentions
to reciprocate matter more than a recipient’s ability to do so. This implies that re-
ducing strategic uncertainty about a competitor’s behavior has a stronger effect on
information flows than reducing environmental uncertainty (about the competitor’s
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implications.
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1 Introduction
Economists have for a long time studied the market for ideas and the functioning of the
resultant information exchange (e.g., Arrow, 1962). Of particular interest to the economists
are the often puzzling cases where competitors share information that is of strategic value
to them. Numerous empirical studies provide evidence of such knowledge exchanges in a
variety of competitive settings.1 These studies suggest that an individual’s expectation of
reciprocity is a motivation to share information, arguing that “potential future reciprocity
is weighed against the current loss of competitiveness” (Ha¨ussler et al., 2014). Individuals
are willing to incur the potential costs of sharing valuable information if they expect to
receive something of similar value in return. This form of sharing can lead to a type of
feedback loop.2 In this paper, we model information exchange as an indeterminate horizon
centipede game and investigate how expectations of reciprocity affect the trading of ideas in
a controlled laboratory environment. We argue that a player must have both the ability and
the intention to reciprocate, and we ask how a player’s expectations regarding the abilities
and intentions of others differentially affect the incentive to share information.
Our formal representation of a feedback loop is based on work by Stein (2008) who
develops a model of word-of-mouth communication to characterize the conditions under
which competitors have an incentive to share private information. Information is generated
through an exogenous random process, and communication occurs via an escalating feedback
loop with potential payoffs increasing in the number of interactions. Communication breaks
if a player either conceals new information or has no new information to share. Players face a
simple tradeoff: concealing new information gives them a relative information advantage that
translates into a payoff advantage, but it also breaks the feedback loop for future sharing,
and they forego the chance to generate more information which increases absolute payoffs
even when there is no disparity in those payoffs. Stein (2008) shows that if the probability
1These settings include the steel minimills industry (von Hippel, 1987; Schrader, 1991), the semi-
conductor industry (Appleyard, 1996), academic research (Bouty, 2000; Ha¨ussler, 2011; Ha¨ussler et al.,
2014), and financial investment (Crawford et al., 2017; Botelho, 2018; Rantala, forthcoming).
2This information exchange can be in the form of comments or suggestions (i.e., a critical evaluation of
the idea) or in the form of an additional idea or a refinement of a previously shared idea. For the rest of
the paper, we refer to the latter kind.
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that a player generates new information—and is therefore able to share information—is
sufficiently high, then a sharing equilibrium in which both players always share exists.
We present two simple extensions of this model. First, we introduce a player’s expec-
tations of a rival’s intentions because in order to reciprocate a rival must both successfully
generate new information and be willing to share it. Second, we assume asymmetric abilities
so that the distinction between ability and intention is identifiable. With these adaptations,
we answer the following questions: First, can we establish a sustainable exchange of in-
formation via this model of a feedback loop, and is this exchange more successful as the
relative benefits from the exchange increase? Second, how do players’ expectations of reci-
procity drive their decisions to initiate and maintain the information exchange? Third,
what elements of players’ experiences affect the formation of their expectations about a
rival’s intended behavior?
For our laboratory experiment, we use a narrative in which two fund managers ex-
change ideas for investment opportunities and compete over the uncommitted capital of
investors.3 We choose this finance-related frame because a financial context would be more
familiar to our mostly business school student subjects.4 Further, because we do not con-
sider trading per se but rather consider the exchange of ideas between competitors, the
ways that expectations of reciprocity incentivize information exchange are similar to those
highlighted in the existing empirical literature.5
3We provide experimental instructions and a detailed description of the game in the Online Appendix that
can be downloaded at https://sites.google.com/site/bganglmair/research/Reciprocity-OApp.pdf.
4A side effect of the finance narrative is the immediate application to an empirical puzzle in the finance
literature. It is surprising that—in spite of the large sunk costs that funds incur to ensure informational
security and the potentially larger opportunity costs incurred by disclosing valuable investment ideas—there
appears to be evidence suggesting that managers circumvent their own safeguards in order to collaborate with
rivals. Why do competing fund managers share information? Shiller and Pound (1989:47) survey investors
and find that “direct interpersonal communications are very important in [their] decisions,” and Shiller
(2000:155) concludes that “[w]ord-of-mouth transmission of ideas appears to be an important contributor
to day-to-day or hour-to-hour stock market fluctuations.” More recent empirical evidence, documenting
the extent to which financial trades are correlated (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Hau, 2001; Feng and
Seasholes, 2004; Hong et al., 2004; Ivkovic´ and Weisbenner, 2005; Brown et al., 2008; Shive, 2010; Pool
et al., 2015), suggests that information sharing among investors continues unabated, and that even hedge
fund managers in direct competition with one another appear to share investment ideas.
5Fund managers compete across potential inventors for funds, and each manager exerts monopolistic
control over a fraction of the market (e.g., through lock-in periods (Agarwal and Naik, 2000) or “side
pockets” that are frozen by managers so that redemptions do not force the inefficient early liquidation of
assets (McCrary, 2002:192)) and competes with their rivals over the remaining portion (e.g., when hedge
funds are not closed to new investors after creation and fund managers continue to compete to raise additional
capital either from the fund’s existing investors or from new investors (Goetzmann et al., 2003)).
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In the theoretical model, if the benefits from sharing information (i.e., the long-term
payoffs from a feedback loop) are sufficiently high (relative to the immediate gains from
concealing information), then the game becomes a coordination game with two equilibria:
both players either always share or never share information. We show empirically that, with
high net benefits from sharing, subjects are more likely to play the payoff-dominant sharing
strategy. In line with existing empirical results, we conclude that we are more likely to
observe an exchange of information when a player’s expectation of reciprocity (increasing the
net benefits from sharing) is higher. We show that the primary determinants for a player’s
initiation and maintenance of a feedback loop are the recipient’s ability and her intention to
reciprocate. We further find that a player’s expectations of the recipient’s intentions to share,
rather than her ability, have a greater effect on the player’s own incentives to share. Thus,
strategic uncertainty (via intentions) has a greater effect on the exchange of information
than environmental uncertainty (via ability). Last, we show that subjects form complex
and cumulative beliefs about their rivals’ intentions to share, in part by documenting how
negative past experiences (caused by either a rival or by oneself) result in subjects that are
less inclined to share information.
Our paper contributes to the literature in a number of ways. In the context of finance,
Crawford et al. (2017), Botelho (2018), and Rantala (forthcoming) provide evidence of
information sharing among investment professionals. Our results contribute to this literature
that studies the mechanisms behind the empirical phenomenon of correlated trading (e.g.,
Duffie and Manso, 2007; Colla and Mele, 2010; Manela, 2014; Andrei and Cujean, 2017) by
providing a more nuanced picture of individuals’ incentives and a direct test of one of the
key theoretical arguments (Stein, 2008). Beyond these three studies, the relevant literature
is limited by the data and is merely suggestive of managers collaborating in the manner
we describe (e.g., Hong et al., 2004; Cohen et al., 2008; Pool et al., 2015). Our results
on the effects of subjects’ past experiences also relate to recent work on the collaborative
and reciprocal nature of crowdfunding platforms. Zvilichovsky et al. (2015), for instance,
document the effect of an entrepreneur’s funding history on financing outcomes. They show
that project owners back their backers at a rate that is significantly higher than that for
other comparable projects.
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Numerous empirical studies covering a variety of industries have highlighted the role
of expected reciprocity as a driver of individuals’ incentives to share information.6 von Hippel
(1987) and Schrader (1991) report empirical evidence of know-how sharing of competing
firms in the steel minimill industry. Bouty (2000), Ha¨ussler (2011), and Ha¨ussler et al. (2014)
present results for knowledge sharing in academic research. Ga¨chter et al. (2010) (modeling
knowledge sharing as a coordination game with multiple equilibria) present experimental
results for a setting of private-collective innovation (see von Hippel and von Krogh, 2006)
in which private investors fund public goods innovation. Ingram and Roberts (2000) find a
positive relationship between financial performance and the existence of friendship-networks
(for “better information exchange”) between managers of competing hotels. We add to this
literature by identifying how expectations of reciprocity can underly and sustain these types
of observable information exchange.
The structure of our model is akin to a centipede game (Rosenthal, 1981; Binmore,
1987); however, our game is of indeterminate horizon. In the finite-horizon centipede game, a
number of articles have studied subjects’ choices in a laboratory setting and found that only
a small fraction of games ended in the first round (i.e., the equilibrium outcome)—from 0.7%
in McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) to 3.9% in Levitt et al. (2011) (with expert chess players as
subjects). Our indeterminate-horizon centipede game has at least two (Nash) equilibria. In
fact, we calibrate our model so that the unique equilibrium in the finite-horizon version is
not the only equilibrium in our model. We choose a calibration so that one of the equilibria
is a sharing equilibrium and focus on the determinants that increase the chance that players
coordinate on this payoff-dominant equilibrium.7
Last, our results relate to the general literature on disclosure of secrets and ex-
change of information among agents with competing interests. In recent work, Hellmann
and Perotti (2011), Guttman et al. (2014), Dziuda and Gradwohl (2015), and Augenblick
and Bodoh-Creed (2018) provide theoretical treatments of different aspects of this general
6Botelho (2018) provides a detailed review of the literature.
7Our version of the centipede game also differs in a second dimension. The previous literature has assumed
an exponential increase in subjects’ payoffs (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992; Nagel and Tang, 1998; Kawagoe
and Takizawa, 2012) or a linear increase in payoffs (Bornstein et al., 2004; Gerber and Wichardt, 2010).
Following the functional form in Stein (2008), we assume players’ payoffs are increasing at a diminishing
rate.
4
theme. Ganglmair and Tarantino (2014) extend the model in Stein (2008) by allowing one of
the players to hold prior information (a “secret”) about the ex post distribution of payoffs.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present our theoretical framework
of information exchange as an asymmetric version of the model in Stein (2008). In Section 3,
we discuss the experimental design and develop our empirical hypotheses. In Section 4,
we present our main results. In Section 5, we conclude with a discussion of implications
for the design of formal and informal platforms of knowledge exchange within and across
organizations.
2 Theoretical Framework
2.1 Summary of the Model
For our theoretical framework, we consider a centipede game with a non-deterministic final
period.8 Instead, in each round, the game ends by chance when a player fails to generate
a new idea to share9 or by choice if that player decides to conceal the idea. Concealing an
idea yields a temporary payoff advantage. If the player decides to share the idea (and thus
continues the game), then the rival has the ability to generate and the subsequent option to
share a new idea to increase the overall (common) stock of ideas. A player with an idea to
share therefore faces a tradeoff between the short-term gains from concealing or potential
long-term gains from cooperation. We use this framework to derive a necessary condition for
an environment in which both a sharing equilibrium and a non-sharing equilibrium exist. We
use payoff dominance as an equilibrium selection criterion and argue that relaxing the sharing
condition results in the sharing equilibrium being selected more often. This eventually allows
us to discuss and study the differential effect of a player’s ability to generate a new idea and
her expectations of the rival’s intentions to share that new idea on the expected equilibrium
outcome.
8In this section, we present the main results of the model alongside an abridged version of the notation
of the model. We provide a full treatment, including formal results, in the Appendix.
9In order to preserve the link of the description of our theoretical model to the storyline in the experiment,
we refer to this information as ideas (e.g., for investment opportunities) where more ideas increase payoffs.
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Table 1: Model Notation for Parameters and Decisions
Variable Description Calibration
A, B Players; A moves in odd rounds, B in even rounds
pi Ability: Probability that player i = A,B generates a new idea at
the beginning of Round t
50% or 90%
βn Production costs with decay parameter β and n the number of ideas β = 3/4
µ Market size µ = 400
θ Competition intensity θ = 3/8
φ˜i Expected net benefits from sharing for player i = A,B
σj Probability that player j shares a newly generated idea
σ˜j Expected intentions: Player i’s expectations that player j shares a
newly generated idea
pij ≡ pj σ˜j Expectations of reciprocity: Player i’s expectations in t that she
receives a new idea from player j in t+ 1
2.2 Formal Setup
Our framework is an asymmetric version of the word-of-mouth communication model in
Stein (2008). In Table 1, we provide a summary of the model notation. Two players take
turns generating and sharing new ideas. Player A moves in odd rounds, and player B moves
in even rounds. Player A is endowed with an idea in t = 1 and must decide whether to
share this idea with player B or keep it to herself. If she decides to conceal the idea, then
the game ends. If she shares, then the game continues. Upon observing A’s idea, in t = 2,
player B generates a new idea with probability pB. If she is successful, she must decide
whether to share this idea with A or keep it to herself. If she conceals the idea, the game
ends. If she shares, the game proceeds to t = 3 in which player A can generate a new idea
with probability pA. The game proceeds in this fashion in all t. We provide a graphical
depiction of the game structure in panel (a) of Figure 1.
More ideas increase a player’s potential payoffs. The number of ideas ni a player i
can access is the common stock of ideas: the number of ideas she herself has generated plus
the number of ideas the other player has shared with her. Stein (2008) uses a simple model
in which ideas reduce a player’s production costs βni with β < 1. We follow this payoff
structure and provide a graphical illustration in panel (b) of Figure 1. Each player faces a
market (of size µ) with unit-demand consumers that have a valuation of one. The players
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compete a` la Bertrand in a fraction θ of the market and are monopolists in their 1 − θ
respective markets. In the monopolistic segment of their market, additional ideas increase
profits regardless of how many ideas the other player can access. A player’s payoffs from
this segment, when holding ni ideas, are (1− θ)µ (1− βni). In the competitive segment,
however, what is important is the relative number of ideas the other player holds. Suppose a
player i has access to more ideas than player j so that ni > nj and β
ni < βnj . By Bertrand
competition, the price in the competitive segment is βnj , and player i’s profits from that
segment are equal to θµ (βnj − βni). Conversely, if ni < nj, then player i’s payoffs in the
competitive segment are equal to zero.10 The realized payoffs for player i are
µ [(1− θ) (1− βni) + θmax {βnj − βni , 0}] . (1)
The payoffs in the model give rise to a simple tradeoff for a player who was successful
in generating a new idea in t. Player i must choose between short-term gains from concealing
and potential future gains from sharing. Concealing the idea gives her a cost advantage of
βt−1−βt over the other player because ni = t and nj = t−1. This cost advantage materializes
immediately because concealing the idea also means that the game ends and no further ideas
can be generated. We refer to such termination of the game as termination by choice. A
player’s payoffs in t in this case are
concealt = µ
[
1− βt − θ (1− βt−1)] . (2)
Sharing the idea, on the other hand, gives the rival j a chance to generate a new idea
in t + 1 (with probability pj) and then share this idea back with player i, which will give i
the chance to continue the game in t+ 2, and so forth. When making this decision to share,
player i must form expectations about receiving information back from player j. In order
for player i to draw another new idea in t+2, player j must generate a new idea in t+1 and
10The structure of the payoffs here can also be seen in the professional investment market described in
the introduction and used in the experiment. For a manager’s payoffs, both the returns on capital and
the amount of capital matter. The monopolistic segment captures the payoffs from existing capital (where
more ideas generate higher returns), whereas the competitive segment captures the payoffs from attracting
additional capital (where more ideas than the competitors generate higher fund flows and thus higher
management fees).
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Figure 1: Model Timeline and Payoff Structure
◦ N • N •
Player A

share
conceal
t = 1

pB
1− pB
Player B

share
conceal
t = 2, 4, . . .

pA
1− pA
Player A

share
conceal
t = 3, 5, . . .
(a) Timeline of Word-of-Mouth Communication
own Segment A own Segment B
competitive
Segment C
A: µ (1− βnA ) B: µ (1− βnB )A: µmax {β
nB − βnA , 0}
B: µmax {βnA − βnB , 0}
1− θ 1− θθ
(b) Competition and Payoffs
be willing to share that idea with player i. Suppose that player j shares a newly generated
idea with probability σj.
11 We can then write player i’s expectations about player j sharing
as σ˜j ≡ E(σj). Combining both components, a player i’s expectations of receiving a new
idea from player j in t + 1 upon sharing an idea in t (i.e., the expectations of reciprocity)
are pij ≡ pjσ˜j.
A player i’s expected payoffs from sharing in t (and all future t′ > t), when she
expects information in return with probability pij, is then equal to
shareit = µ (1− θ)
∞∑
k=0
pki pi
k
j
[
(1− pij)
(
1− βt+2k)+ pij (1− βt+1+2k)] . (3)
Player i shares a new idea in t if shareit ≥ concealt. After some manipulation, this expression
can be rewritten as
φ˜i(σ˜j) ≡ µ
[
1 + βpi
1 + βpij
βpij − θ
]
≥ 0. (4)
11For instance, assume that σj , j = A,B is a time-invariant mixed strategy in t.
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This term φ˜i(σ˜j) denotes a player i’s expected net benefits from sharing in t when she expects
player j to share a newly generated idea with probability σ˜j in all future rounds.
12 The net
benefits from sharing are increasing in pij = pjσ˜j and pi.
2.3 Equilibrium and Selection
Condition (4) is necessary for a sharing equilibrium – but not sufficient. If the net benefits
from sharing φ˜i(σ˜j) are positive for some σ˜j, then two pure-strategy equilibria exist:
13 First,
in a sharing equilibrium, all players always share newly generated ideas (so that in equilib-
rium σj = σ˜j = 1 for j = A,B), and the game continues until it is terminated by chance.
Second, in a non-sharing equilibrium, neither player ever shares a new idea, and the game
is terminated by choice (by player A) in t = 1.
We utilize payoff dominance as our equilibrium selection criterion (Harsanyi and
Selten, 1988; Cooper et al., 1990) and exploit relative payoff differences for our theoretical
predictions of the model (in the Appendix). From the sharing condition (4) we can see that
the sharing equilibrium payoff-dominates the non-sharing equilibrium. Anything that relaxes
the sharing condition, by increasing the value of φ˜i(σ˜j), reinforces the payoff dominance and
induces players to choose the sharing strategy more often.
3 Experimental Design and Hypotheses
3.1 Experimental Design
We conducted the computerized experiments at the Center and Laboratory for Behavioral
Operations and Economics (CLBOE) at the University of Texas at Dallas. The partici-
pants were registered with CLBOE and were drawn from a pool of both undergraduate and
graduate students. 100 subjects participated across four different treatments. Each subject
participated in only one treatment. Each session lasted anywhere from 80 to 120 minutes,
12The expected payoffs from sharing in equation (3) reduce to the analogous expression in Stein (2008)
when σ˜j = 1 and pi = pj = pij = p. Similarly for sharing condition (4) that reduces to the simple sharing
condition, φi ≡ µ [pβ − θ] ≥ 0 with µ = 1.
13In the Appendix, we fully characterize these two pure strategy equilibria (Proposition A.1). We also
characterize a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which player i’s mixed strategy σi is such that φ˜j(σi) = 0 and
player j’s expectations are consistent with this strategy so that σ˜i = σi (Proposition A.2).
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depending on the treatment. Payments ranged from $10 to $30, averaging $19.30.14 Subjects
in longer sessions generally had greater earnings.
The number of subjects ranged from 24 to 28 in each session. We randomly divided
the subjects into two groups of equal size. Group membership was anonymous, meaning
that subjects did not know who else was assigned to a particular group. They were informed
that they had been randomly assigned to a group and would be matched only with subjects
from the same group.
Each session was divided into two parts: the first part consisted of a Holt-Laury
risk-preference task (Holt and Laury, 2002), and the second part consisted of our main
experiment. We conducted the Holt-Laury risk-preference task via paper and dice before
conducting the main experiment.15 The main experiment was programmed and executed
via zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). We revealed the outcomes of the lottery in the Holt-Laury
risk-preference task and the respective payoffs after the computerized experiment at the
end of the session. We provided subjects with detailed printed instructions for both the
Holt-Laury task and the computerized experiment and conducted a short quiz after the
experimenter had read out the instructions.
In the computerized experiment, at the beginning of each period, we randomly
matched subjets into pairs without replacement. After the matches were determined, we
randomly assigned the subjects the roles of player A and player B with all the parameters
and payoffs being common knowledge for the pair. The parameters did not change for the
duration of the match. When new matches were established, new roles and their respective
values of pi were revealed as common knowledge. For the instructions of the word-of-mouth
communication game, we used a fund-manager narrative in which two players (i.e., fund
managers) exchange investment opportunity ideas and compete over the capital of new
investors.16 In each round t ≥ 1 of a match, after having generated a new idea (with proba-
bility pi), player i takes two actions. First, we surveyed player i’s expectations of player j’s
14These figures include a show-up bonus of $5 and average payoffs of $2.5 from a Holt and Laury (2002)
risk-preference task.
15We control for subjects’ risk preferences and many other individual characteristics in robustness results
presented in the Appendix.
16From the instructions of the computerized experiment: “You are a fund manager. Your goal is to earn
as much money as possible. Your earnings can increase in two ways: a) increase the returns from your
investments and b) obtain more investors.”
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intentions, σ˜j.
17 We did so by asking player i to report her expectation (between 0% and
100%) that player j would decide to share an idea in the next round (provided that player
j generated a new idea).18 Second, the player decided whether to share or conceal the idea.
On their decision screens, subjects saw their assigned role (fund manager A or B)
and payoffs (for both players) for the current round and the subsequent two rounds for
all possible outcomes.19 Provided that player i shared an idea in round t, once player j
generated a new idea with probability pj in t+ 1, she was shown the decision screen for that
round. If, instead, player i decided to conceal the idea, then the match was terminated.
Alternatively, if player i failed to generate a new idea, then the match was also terminated.
From the current match’s payoffs, players were able to infer whether the match had been
terminated by chance (no new idea was generated) or choice (a player decided to conceal the
new idea).20 After all matches had been terminated, the subjects observed their payoffs from
the current match and their accumulated payoffs from all previous matches. This concluded
a match. We then rematched the subjects within their respective groups, and a new game
was played.
We had four treatments—only one treatment per session but with multiple groups
per treatment. We implemented the game depicted in Figure 1 with the realized payoffs in
equation (1). We set µ = 400, β = 3/4, and θ = 3/8 but varied the success probabilities pA
and pB by assigning values pi ∈ {50%, 90%} depending on the treatment.21 Therefore, our
four treatments referred to as High, Low, Low-High, and High-Low varied only in pA
and pB. We summarize the calibrations for the four treatments of the experiment in Table 2.
17For all odd rounds, we obtain player A’s expectations σ˜B ; for even rounds, we obtain player B’s expec-
tations σ˜A. Note that, while the truthful reporting of expectations σ˜j is not incentived, formation of these
expectations is fully incentivized within the game itself. This is because, as player j’s future actions have
a direct effect on player i’s payoffs, player i’s expected payoffs increase in the accuracy of her expectations
σ˜j . We are confident that, on average, these expectations are reported truthfully, possibly with more noise
(Trautmann and van de Kuilen, 2015).
18We used the following wording: “If, in the next round, the other fund manager successfully generates
a new idea (i.e., “chance” does not terminate the match), how likely do you think the other fund manager
will share this newly generated idea with you?”
19In the printed instructions for the experiment, we provided a table with player A’s and player B’s payoffs
for the first 14 rounds for all possible paths of termination of a match.
20If the match terminates with both players having the same payoff, then it was terminated by chance.
We make this point explicit in the printed instructions.
21For the results presented in the main text, we use a constant degree of competition θ. We provide results
on the effect of competition (through a higher value of θ) in the Online Appendix.
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Table 2: Calibration and Treatments
pB = 90% pB = 50%
pA = 90% Treatment High Treatment High-Low
(φ˜i(1) = 120, for i = A,B) (φ˜A(1) = 32.73, φ˜B(1) = 71.64)
pA = 50% Treatment Low-High Treatment Low
(φ˜A(1) = 71.64, φ˜B(1) = 32.73) (φ˜i(1) = 0, for i = A,B)
In all four treatments, the sharing condition (4) is satisfied for σ˜j = 1 so that φ˜i(1) ≥ 0.
That means, in all four treatments, a sharing equilibrium exists.
3.2 Hypotheses
We propose seven hypotheses related to the effects of a player’s and her rival’s ability, as
well as the player’s expectations about the rival’s future intentions. The model in Section 2
drives all our hypotheses. We detail formal derivations in Appendix A.
We begin by focusing on the first decision by player A (in Round 1) in each match.
This way, the player’s expectations are not affected by an earlier decision of the current rival
(within the same match). We expect player A to share more often when her expected net
benefits φ˜A (provided in Table 2) are higher.
Hypothesis 1 (Higher Expected Net Benefits). Player A shares more often in t = 1 when
φ˜A is high. That means she shares (a) more often in treatment High relative to Low-
High, (b) more often in treatment Low-High relative to High-Low, and (c) more often
in treatment High-Low relative to Low.
Furthermore, player A’s expected net benefits φ˜A are an increasing function of her
expectation of receiving new information, piB = pBσ˜B. Therefore, ceteris paribus, player
A should share more when piB increases: first, as the ability of player B, captured by pB,
increases (Hypothesis 2); and second, as player A’s expectations that player B will share a
newly generated idea, captured by σ˜B, increases (Hypothesis 3).
12
Hypothesis 2 (Rival’s Ability). Player A shares more often in t = 1 when pB is high.
That means she shares more often in treatment High relative to High-Low and Low-
High relative to Low.
Hypothesis 3 (Expected Intentions). Player A shares more often in t = 1 when her beliefs
σ˜B about player B sharing an idea in t = 2 are high.
While pB and σ˜B both increase piB, comparative statics (utilizing our model results)
show that they exhibit different marginal effects on player A’s decision to share in t = 1. In
fact, the effect of pB is stronger than that of σ˜B if pB < σ˜B. If, conversely, pB > σ˜B, then
σ˜B has a bigger effect than pB at the margin. This is Hypothesis 4.
Hypothesis 4 (Expected Intentions vs. Rival’s Ability). As the ratio pB/σ˜B increases, the
difference of the marginal effects of pB and σ˜B changes from negative to positive.
We further expect player A’s own ability, pA, to affect her own decision to share. This
effect is two-pronged. Player A’s own-success probability has a positive and direct effect
when deciding to share. This reflects the player’s expectations of a mechanical increase in
game length (and generated value). Moreover, an increase in pA comes with a positive and
indirect effect through the player’s expectations of her rival’s intentions, σ˜B. The logic for
the indirect effect is that, as player A’s ability increases, the likelihood that player B will
share (through symmetry of Hypothesis 2) also increases. This effect on player B induces
player A to increase her expectations σ˜B that player B will share a newly generated idea.
The following hypothesis reflects this joint effect. Our theoretical framework, however, does
not inform us as to which of the two effects is stronger. We will address this empirical
question utilizing regression results in the next section.
Hypothesis 5 (Own Ability). Player A shares more often in t = 1 when pA is high. That
means she shares more often in treatment High relative to Low-High and High-Low
relative to Low.
Our next hypothesis draws a comparison between a player’s own ability, pA, and the
rival’s ability, pB while holding σ˜B constant. Accounting for the effect of expectations is
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important because expectations can change when either player’s abilities change. Compar-
ative statics show that the effect of pA on player A’s willingness to share is weaker than the
effect of pB. Intuitively, this difference arises because the outcome of the rival’s ability (i.e.,
generating a new idea) is realized immediately, whereas the outcome of player A’s ability is
not realized until the following round.
Hypothesis 6 (Own vs. Rival’s Ability). Holding expectations σ˜B constant, the positive
effect of pA on player A’s decision to share in t = 1 is weaker than the effect of pB. That
means player A shares more often in treatment Low-High than High-Low.22
Our final hypothesis addresses the formation of a player’s expectations σ˜B as a func-
tion of abilities, pA and pB. Of the two abilities, we expect player A’s own ability to have a
stronger effect. The intuition is an extension of the idea behind Hypothesis 6. By symmetry,
pA has a stronger effect than pB on player B’s willingness to share. As a consequence, pA
will have a stronger effect than pB on player A’s expectations of player B’s intentions, that
is, on σ˜B. Hypothesis 7 summarizes this more generally:
Hypothesis 7 (Effect of Abilities on Expectations). The effect of pi on σ˜j is positive and
istronger than the positive effect of pj on σ˜j.
4 Experimental Results
This section contains our results and is divided into three parts. First, we discuss the data
in aggregate and provide summary results of sharing. Next, we provide detailed results
related to ability and intention. Last, we focus on game dynamics and the formation of
beliefs about intentions.
4.1 Aggregate Data and Sharing
We begin by addressing the first of our three questions: Can we establish a sustainable
exchange of information in our model of a feedback loop, and is this exchange more successful
22For this comparison of treatments, let σA(High) − σA(Low-High) denote the effect of pA on player
A’s sharing behavior, and let σA(High)− σA(High-Low) denote the effect of pB on her sharing behavior.
The effect of pA is weaker than that of pB if σA(Low-High) > σA(High-Low), when player A shares more
often in treatment Low-High than High-Low.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Experimental Results
This table provides basic summary statistics for the four main treatments of the experiment (High, Low, Low-High, and
High-Low), as summarized in Table 2. We conducted all treatments in one session with two groups of equal size sg . For
the calibration of the treatments, see Table 2. We list the number of subjects per treatment; the number of matches (i.e.,
the number of pair-wise word-of-mouth communications, sg (1− sg)); the average number of rounds each match proceeds; the
average earnings per match (in $) for each subject; and the average expected intentions for each of the players.
Treatment
Low- High-
High Low High Low
Subjects 24 28 24 24
Matches 132 182 132 132
Average # of rounds (and decisions by a player) 5.62 1.43 2.60 1.70
Average earnings (in $) per match . . .
. . . for all subjects 1.57 0.75 1.16 0.83
. . . for player A 1.58 0.91 1.19 0.98
. . . for player B 1.56 0.59 1.13 0.67
Expected intentions . . .
. . . by player A (reported σ˜B) 82.4% 56.1% 59.7% 50.9%
. . . by player B (reported σ˜A) 78.7% 59.8% 56.4% 64.1%
Theoretical expected net benefits φ˜A(1) in Round 1 120.00 0.00 71.64 32.73
Theoretical expected net benefits φ˜B(1) in Round 2 120.00 0.00 32.73 71.64
as the relative benefits from the exchange increase? Basic descriptive statistics paint a
general picture of the players’ actions and the outcomes in all four treatments. In Table 3,
we report the total number of subjects and matches for each treatment, the average duration
of each match, the average earnings (per match) for each subject, and how players expected
their rivals to behave in each treatment. We also report the expected net benefits (in a
sharing equilibrium) of a player continuing in any given period: φ˜A(1) and φ˜B(1).
To start, we observe that treatments with higher expected net benefits φ˜ tend to
have longer matches. Treatment High had an average of 5.62 rounds while treatment Low
only had an average of 1.43 rounds. Longer matches are indicative of the players choosing
sharing-equilibrium strategies. However, a simple comparison of the duration of matches
across treatments is misleading. Direct (first-order) and indirect (higher-order) effects are
at play here. For the direct effect, higher success probabilities (by either player A or player
B) mechanically increase the duration of a match, as a match is less likely terminated by
chance (holding σ˜i constant). For the indirect effect, higher success probabilities are likely
to increase the values of σ˜i. We see this effect on expectations of sharing when we compare
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Figure 2: Distribution of Match Outcomes
This figure depicts the distribution of match outcomes for all four treatments (with N = 182 matches in treatment Low and
N = 132 in the other treatments). We show five distinct outcomes: a match can be (1) terminated by player A in t = 1,
(2) terminated by player B in t = 2, (3) terminated by player A in any t ≥ 3, (3) terminated by player B in any t ≥ 4, (5)
terminated by chance because player A fails to generate a new idea in any odd t, or (6) terminated by chance because player
B fails to generate a new idea in any even t. Numbers for each treatment may not sum up to 100% due to rounding errors.
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expectations σ˜B by player A in treatment Low (56.1%) to expectations in treatment High
(82.4%). Likewise, we see the same pattern when comparing player B’s expectations σ˜A in
treatment Low (59.8%) to the expectations in treatment High (78.7%).
As a first consideration, we take a look at the distribution of causes for termination in
Figure 2. For each treatment, we provide the proportion of matches terminated by choice by
A in t = 1, by B in t = 2, by A in rounds t ≥ 3, by B in rounds t ≥ 4, or by chance because
either A or B failed to generate a new idea. The data suggest that, when the benefits from
sharing are higher, players are more likely to play a sharing strategy. We see this in the
form of a smaller number of all matches terminated by choice by players in treatment High
(46.2%) than in treatment Low (52.1%). When considering player A’s decision in Round 1,
only 10.6% of the matches were ended by player A in treatment High while a much higher
proportion (40.6%) was terminated by player A in treatment Low. This suggests more
sharing, implying a payoff-dominant equilibrium outcome.
For player A, the proportion of matches terminated by choice in t = 1 is equivalent
to player A’s termination rate in Round 1—where the termination rate is simply one minus
the mean of sharing in t = 1. For our first result, we restrict our attention to player A’s
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behavior in Round 1 of each match so that her actions are not affected by the history of
that match.
Result 1. As the expected net benefits of sharing increase, players choose the sharing equi-
librium strategies more often.
In panel (a) of Figure 3, we plot the mean of sharing by player A in Round 1 for
each treatment. For Hypothesis 1, we have ranked the treatments by player A’s expected
net benefits from sharing, predicting more sharing when benefits are higher. From a set of
means tests, we can reject the null for Hypotheses 1(a) and 1(b) at the 5% and 1% level,
respectively, but we fail to reject the null for Hypothesis 1(c) at the 10% level.23
We observe similar patterns for player B’s behavior in Round 2—we plot the mean
of sharing for each treatment in panel (c) of Figure 3. As expected, player B’s termination
rate in treatment Low is considerably higher than in treatment High.24 We return to
higher-round behavior by players in our analysis of game dynamics in Subsection 4.3.
4.2 Reciprocity as a Combination of Ability and Intentions
We next present our main results addressing the second question: How do players’ expecta-
tions of reciprocity drive their decision to initiate and maintain the information exchange?
The probability of reciprocity, piB, is composed of a rival’s ability pB to generate information
(Result 2) and her expected intention σ˜B to share that information (Result 3).
Results 2 and 3 below establish a positive effect of expected reciprocity on player A’s
willingness to share. They comport with the collaboration argument in Stein (2008) and
Crawford et al. (2017) (using Stein’s framework) and confirm the empirical evidence cited
earlier: higher expectations of reciprocity increase players’ incentives to share.
Result 2. Player A is more likely to share an idea when the rival player has higher ability.
We get a first glimpse of this result by comparing the percentage of matches (in
Figure 2) terminated by player A in treatment High with treatment High-Low (21.2% <
23The average treatment effect for Hypothesis 1(a) is 0.0833 (s.e.: 0.043); for Hypothesis 1(b) is 0.1818
(s.e.: 0.054), and Hypothesis 1(c) (s.e.: 0.055).
24The numbers in Figure 2 paint a different picture because they are not proper termination rates but
the proportion of matches terminated by B in t = 2 in percent of all matches.
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Figure 3: Sharing and Expectations in Rounds 1 and 2
This figure plots the average level of sharing in Round 1 by player A (panel (a)), player A’s expectations σ˜B in Round 1 (panel
(b)), the average level of sharing in Round 2 by player B (panel (c)), and player B’s expectations σ˜A in Round 2 (panel (d))
for all four treatments. In panels (b) and (d), we provide box plots for the players’ expectations σ˜j .
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(d) Expectations in Round 2
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38.6%), as well as in treatment Low-High with treatment Low (25.0% < 40.7%). Next,
we restrict our attention to player A’s behavior in Round 1 of each match (panel (a) of
Figure 3). We conclude from simple means tests (in Table A.3 in the Appendix) that the
average treatment effect is as predicted in Hypothesis 2. We reject the null for the hypothesis
at the 1% level.
In Table 4, we also present regression results from probit models. The dependent
variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if player A shares in Round 1 and equal to 0
otherwise. We find a positive marginal effect of the cross-success probability pB on player
A’s sharing behavior, further supporting Result 2.25
Result 3. Player A is more likely to share an idea when she has a higher expectation of
competitor’s intention to share.
We can reject the null for Hypothesis 3 given the results from simple means tests
(in Table A.4 in the Appendix) and a positive and significant marginal effect of expected
intentions σ˜B on player A’s sharing across all specifications in Table 4.
The marginal effects reported in Table 4 (supporting our Hypotheses 2 and 3 and
collectively supporting Hypothesis 1) imply that player A is 3.4% to 6.1% more likely to
share an idea in Round 1 in response to a 10 percentage-point increase in the cross-success
probability pB. Moreover, she is 5.6% to 6.3% more likely to share in Round 1 in response
to a 10 percentage-point increase in her expectations σ˜B that player B will share an idea in
Round 2. These effects are also economically significant. A simple metric to measure a real
effect is the increase in the generated value of the information exchange that is attributable
to player A’s sharing behavior.26 This (lower bound) value increase is 3% in response to
25Note that for these results we use minimal specifications but provide robustness results with extended
model specifications in the Appendix. Our results concerning how the probability of reciprocity (measured
by ability and intentions) affects sharing are robust to a set of variables capturing trust, fairness, and
personal connections: all of which have been associated with increased cooperative or pro-social behavior.
We report these results in Table A.1 and provide detailed descriptions and summary statistics for these
control variables in Table A.2.
26For this calculation, we use the expected duration of the information exchange as derived in Proposi-
tion refthm:prop3 in the Appendix. For the values of pi we use the empirical means (across all treatments)
of the players’ success probabilities. For the values of σi we use the empirical means of the players’ sharing
rates in Round 1 (for A) and Round 2 (for B) and take them to be constant over time (implying that the
calculated effects are lower bounds). To calculate the percentage changes in real value, we compare the
duration (accounting for 10 percentage-point increase of pB or σ˜B) without the behavioral response of A
(keeping sharing rates constant) to the duration with the behavioral response (adjusting A’s sharing rate
by the estimated effects from Model (V) in Table reftab:probit1).
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Table 4: Baseline Results for the Effects of Ability and Intentions
We report probit results for all four treatments. The dependent variable is a dummy variable = 1 if player A shares in Round 1
and = 0 otherwise. Player A’s expectations of receiving information in return are captured by Cross success: pB (player B’s
cross success probability) and Expected intentions: σ˜B (player A’s expectations that player B will share in Round 2). Own
success: pA is player A’s own success probability. The number of observations is the number of Round 1 decisions by player
A. Reported marginal effects are average marginal effects. We report standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variable = 1 if player A shares in Round 1 and = 0 o.w.
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
ME ME ME ME ME
Cross success: pB 0.0034
∗∗∗ 0.0061 ∗∗∗ 0.0060 ∗∗∗ 0.0035 ∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Expected intentions: σ˜B 0.0056
∗∗∗ 0.0063 ∗∗∗ 0.0056 ∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Own success: pA 0.0015
∗ 0.0014 ∗
(0.0009) (0.0008)
Observations 578 578 578 578 578
pseudo R2 0.2256 0.0645 0.2008 0.0685 0.2299
Log-likelihood -265.54 -320.78 -274.02 -319.38 -264.05
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
a 10 percentage-point increase in pB (an elasticity of 0.18) and 4.5% in response to a 10-
percentage-point increase in σ˜B (an elasticity of 0.23).
In Result 4, we summarize the relative effects of the individual components of ex-
pected reciprocity (Hypothesis 4):
Result 4. The effect of strategic uncertainty (captured by σ˜B) is stronger than environmental
uncertainty (captured by pB).
The marginal effects of the components, as reported in Table 4, exhibit a statistically
significant difference.27 In Table 5, we further report the marginal effects of ability and
expected intentions when evaluated at different combinations of pB and σ˜B (such that piB =
p¯iB = mean(pB × σ˜B) = 0.4144). Unlike what is predicted by our theoretical model, we find
a negative difference of the marginal effects in all three scenarios in the table.28 Our results,
therefore, do not support the model prediction, and we refute Hypothesis 4. What we
have demonstrated, however, is that the effect of expected intentions (representing strategic
uncertainty) is stronger than that of ability (representing environmental uncertainty).
27A Wald test of simultaneous equality of coefficients for pj and σ˜j in the models in Tables 4 rejects the
null of equality with at least p < 0.10 in all cases.
28Hypothesis 4 implies that the difference of the marginal effects ought to be positive in the first column
of Table 5 (with pB/σ˜B < 1), zero in the second column (with pB/σ˜B = 1), and negative in the third (with
pB/σ˜B > 1). See the Appendix for the formal argument.
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Table 5: Differential Effects of Ability and Intentions
We report probit results for all four treatments. The dependent variable is a dummy variable = 1 if player A shares in Round
1, and = 0 otherwise. Player A’s expectations of receiving information in return are captured by Cross success: pB (player B’s
cross success probability) and Expected intentions: σ˜B (player A’s expectations that player B will share in Round 2). Own
success: pA is player A’s own success probability. Marginal effects (ME) for model (V) in Table 4 are evaluated at values of
pB and σ˜B , keeping piB = pB σ˜B constant at p¯iB = mean(pB × σ˜B) = 0.4144 (i.e., the sample mean probability of reciprocity),
while pA is at the sample mean. In column (2), we evaluate at values of pB and σ˜B such that pB/σ˜B = 1 and the theoretical
prediction for the difference of marginal effects is zero. In column (1), pB/σ˜B < 1; in column (3), pB/σ˜B > 1. The number
of observations is 578; the pseudo R2 is 0.2299. We report standard errors in parentheses. In the second part of the table, we
report the coefficient of a χ2 test of the difference between pB and σ˜B with p-values in parentheses.
Dependent variable = 1 if player A shares
in Round 1 and = 0 otherwise
ME evaluated at ME evaluated at ME evaluated at
pB = 50% pB = σ˜B% pB = 80%
σ˜B = p¯iB/pB 1 = p¯iB/pB σ˜B = p¯iB/pB
Cross success: pB 0.0033
∗∗∗ 0.0040 ∗∗∗ 0.0042 ∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0009)
Expected intentions: σ˜B 0.0054
∗∗∗ 0.0065 ∗∗∗ 0.0068 ∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0008)
Own success: pA 0.0014
∗ 0.0016 ∗ 0.0017 ∗
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0010)
Test of the difference in coefficients : χ2
pB − σ˜B = 0 5.62 ∗∗ 4.22 ∗∗ 3.56 ∗
(0.0178) (0.0400) (0.0593)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
To illustrate the results from Table 5 and provide additional robustness, we plot
(Figure 4) the difference of the marginal effects as a function of the ratio pB/σ˜B. The solid
line depicts the graph for combinations of pB and σ˜B, keeping the probability of feedback
constant at its sample mean (as in Table 5). The difference of marginal effects is negative
for all values of pB/σ˜B. To establish robustness of this result, we further calculate and plot
the differences of marginal effects holding the probability of feedback constant at various
other values as dashed lines.
Although expectations appear more salient to the sharing decision than ability, ability
is still a significant predictor of whether a player will share an idea. This is true for both
a rival’s ability—summarized in Result 2 above—as well as for a player’s own ability. We
summarize this latter effect in Result 5 below. We also show that the rival’s ability has a
stronger effect on a player’s behavior than the player’s own ability. We summarize this in
Result 6.
Result 5. Player A is more likely to share an idea when her own ability is high.
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Figure 4: Strategic Uncertainty and Environmental Uncertainty
We plot the difference of the marginal effect (on player A’s decision to share) of ability pB and intentions σ˜B as function of
the ratio pB/σ˜B , keeping the probability of reciprocity constant at piB . The solid line depicts the results for the sample mean
of piB , piB = p¯iB = mean(pB × σ˜B) = 0.4144. The dashed lines depict results for piB ∈ {20%, 30%, 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%}. For
piB = 20%, we plot values for pB/σ˜B below 4. The dotted vertical line depicts pB/σ˜B = 1. We predict a difference of zero
for this value and a positive difference for pB/σ˜B < 1. The results are from probit results for all four treatments (in Table 5),
with the dependent variable a dummy variable = 1 if player A shares in Round 1, and = 0 otherwise.
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We can reject the null of Hypothesis 5—reporting results from simple means tests in
Table A.3 in the Appendix. Moreover, the marginal effects of own-success probability pA
(models (IV) and (V) in Table 4) is positive and significant (p < 0.10). These effects imply
that player A is about 1.5% more likely to share an idea in Round 1 in response to a 10
percentage-point increase in her own-success probability. The increase of the real value of
information exchange is 1.1% (an elasticity of 0.07), and thus roughly a third of the effect
of an increase in pB.
The effect of a player’s own-success probability, summarized in Hypothesis 5, is an
overall effect, and the reported means tests results are for this overall effect (since we cannot
keep expected intentions constant). Our regression results, however, allow us to separately
report the direct as well as the indirect effect. The marginal effect of pA in model (IV) is
the overall effect, whereas the effect of pA in model (V), controling for expected intentions
σ˜B, is the isolated direct effect. A comparison of these two suggests that, if there is an
indirect effect of pA on player A’s sharing, operating through player A’s expectations of
player B’s intentions, then this effect is, at best, small. We present additional evidence for
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this in Table 5, where we evaluate the (direct) marginal effect of pA at different levels of
expected intentions. We do not find a significant difference in the coefficients for a player’s
own-success probability—suggesting that the direct effect is stronger than an indirect effect.
Our preliminary findings of a small indirect effect imply that higher-order beliefs do
not play an important role in how one’s own ability affects future behavior. We return
to this question when we study the factors that determine player A’s expectations further
below.
Result 6. Player B’s ability has a stronger effect on player A’s decision to share than player
A’s own ability.
In Hypothesis 6 we posit that, when holding expected intentions σ˜B constant, the
effect of cross-success pB is stronger than of own-success pA. In Figure 2, we see preliminary
evidence for this when comparing the fraction of matches terminated by player A in treat-
ment High-Low relative to treatment Low-High. Treatment High-Low (with pB < pA)
exhibits shorter matches, and a larger fraction of those matches are terminated by player A
than in treatment Low-High (with pB > pA). We provide results from simple means tests
in Table A.3 in the Appendix. Our regression results in Table 4 paint an analogous picture.
We find that the marginal effects of pB are greater than those of pA in all specifications.
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4.3 Players’ Beliefs About Rivals’ Intentions
In this section, we address the third question: what elements of players’ experiences affect
the formation of their expectations about a rival’s intended behavior? We first extend our
theoretical framework by introducing two types of players. This will provide for formal
guidance when discussing the empirical results.
4.3.1 Game Dynamics
Suppose a player can be one of two types: sophisticated (S) or non-sophisticated (NS). A
sophisticated player is a strategic player as introduced earlier in our model. She shares if
29To confirm, we perform a Wald test, which rejects the null that the two effects are the same. In model
(IV), equality of the coefficients for pB and pA (the overall effect of pA) can be rejected at the 10% level. In
model (V), equality of the coefficients for pB and pA (the direct effect of pA because σ˜B is controlled for)
can be rejected at the 1% level.
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the sharing condition (4) is satisfied and conceals otherwise. The non-sophisticated type is
not strategic and shares at random. We assume a probability of sharing of 1/2. We further
denote by γm,t player i’s belief (in Round t of Match m) that player j is the sophisticated
type. For the discussion to follow, we assume the sharing condition (4) is satisfied.
Players update their beliefs about their rivals’ type along two dimensions. First, as
the process progresses, players can update their beliefs within a match m. We apply Bayes’
rule for updating beliefs. In t ≥ 2, upon having observed sharing in t − 1, a player’s belief
is equal to
γm,t =
γm,t−2
γm,t−2 + (1− γm,t−2) 1/2 =
2γm,t−2
1 + γm,t−2
. (5)
For example, let player A’s belief at the outset of Match m be γm,1 = 1/2. When reaching
t = 3 (and player B has shared in t = 2), her belief is γm,3 = 2/3. In t = 5, her belief
is γm,5 = 4/5. This illustrates that, as a player observes sharing by her rival, she becomes
more optimistic about the rival being the sophisticated type (who always shares because the
sharing condition is satisfied).
The second dimension of belief updating is across matches. For this, it is useful to
consider a player’s belief at the end of a previous match. We denote this end-of-match belief
by γˆm. Because a sophisticated type (by assumption) does not conceal an idea, if a match
ends by choice (by the rival), then the player’s belief that the rival is a sophisticated type
is zero. Otherwise (when the match is terminated by chance or by player i herself), the
end-of-match belief is equal to player i’s belief in equation (5) from a sequence of T rounds:
γˆm =
 0 if Match m is terminated by choice by the rivalγm,T if otherwise. (6)
For each match, player i is randomly rematched with a new rival from a pool of
rivals. Player i’s belief that an independently drawn rival for match m is a sophisticated
player is equal to the sample mean γ¯m−1 of her end-of-match beliefs γˆm of the previous m−1
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independent draws, with
γ¯m−1 =
m−1∑
m′=1
γˆm′
m
. (7)
The prior belief at the beginning of a match is thus equal to γm,1 = γ¯m−1.
Players who experience termination by choice by one of their rivals will ultimately
lower their belief. Consider the example above with m = 1 and assume the match terminates
by chance in t = 6. Player i’s end-of-match belief is γˆ1 = 4/5. This is also the belief at the
outset of Match 2, γ2,1 = γ¯1 = γˆ1. Suppose that in Match 2, rival j terminates the match
in some t and player i’s end-of-match belief is γˆ2 = 0. Her belief at the outset of Match 3
is then γ3,1 = γ¯2 = 2/5, and therefore lower than at the outset of Match 2. Note that the
negative effect of termination on beliefs weakens as the number of played matches increases.
A player i’s expected intentions σ˜j of player j are a function of her belief about player
j’s type. This concept of type allows for a discussion of the dynamics of expectations both
within a match and across matches.
4.3.2 Results
In Table 6, we present results detailing the determinants of player i’s expectations σ˜j in
Round t. Unlike before, we now consider both player A’s and player B’s expectations in
all rounds. This gives us a total of 1,574 observations (i.e., decisions to share or conceal,
and the reported expectations σ˜j). We report the results for tobit models with reported
expectations as the dependent variable.
We have shown (Result 5) a positive effect of own ability (pA) on player A’s willingness
to share. Moreover, the effect of player A’s own ability is weaker than the effect of player B’s
ability pB (Result 6). We now ask whether these results (on behavior) translate into correct
belief formation. Given correct belief formation, the previous results imply that ability pi is
expected to have a stronger effect on σ˜j (player i’s expectations) than player j’s ability pj.
We do not find any support for such higher-order belief formation:
Result 7. There is no conclusive evidence of rational higher-order belief formation.
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Table 6: Determinants of Expectations
We report the results from tobit models for the determinants of a player i’s subjective expectations in t about player j’s
intentions to share in t + 1 in all treatments. The dependent variable is σ˜j ∈ [0, 100] in a given round t of a match. Cross
pj is player j’s cross-success probability; Own pi is player i’s own-success probability; Match is the match number; Round is
the round number, t, in a given match; Other Terminated is a dummy variable = 1 if player i has previously had a match
partner (either as player i or player j) who terminated that match by choice (i.e., concealed an idea), and = 0 otherwise; Own
Terminated is a dummy variable = 1 if player i has previously terminated a match by choice (i.e., concealed an idea), either as
player i or as player j, and = 0 otherwise; Other × Own Terminated is an interaction term. Both Other Terminated and Own
Terminated are = 0 in the very first match. Subject Dummies indicates whether subject dummies are included to control for
subject fixed effects. The number of observations is the total number of decisions by player i in all t. The left-censoring limit
for the tobit model is 0; the right-censoring limit is 100. We report standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variable: Player i’s subjective expectations σ˜j ∈ [0, 100]
in a given Round t of a match
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Cross pj 0.4314
∗∗∗ 0.4236 ∗∗∗ 0.4263 ∗∗∗ -0.2115 -0.2579
(0.0443) (0.0434) (0.0437) (0.2405) (0.2401)
Own pi 0.1971
∗∗∗ 0.2062 *** 0.2073 ∗∗∗ -0.3673 -0.4127 ∗
(0.0453) (0.0443) (0.0443) (0.2404) (0.2400)
Match -0.9082 ∗∗∗ -0.1166 -0.1013 -0.0887 -0.1612
(0.2391) (0.3451) (0.3464) (0.2936) (0.2934)
Round 1.6110 ∗∗∗ 1.4826 ∗∗∗ 1.4833 ∗∗∗ 0.4001 ∗∗ 0.4008 ∗∗
(0.2455) (0.2402) (0.2402) (0.1992) (0.1987)
Other 2.9797 2.1690 -5.7261 ∗∗ -9.5313 ∗∗∗
Terminated (2.4343) (2.8949) (2.2560) (2.5397)
Own -15.7139 ∗∗∗ -17.2368 ∗∗∗ -0.4291 -8.4098 ∗∗
Terminated (1.7583) (3.4304) (2.2003) (3.2932)
Other × Own 2.0060 11.7965 ∗∗∗
Terminated (3.8786) (3.6334)
Subject dummies No No No Yes Yes
Observations 1574 1574 1574 1574 1574
pseudo R2 0.0211 0.0272 0.0272 0.1009 0.1017
Log-likelihood -6420.43 -6380.57 -6380.44 -5896.91 -5891.65
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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In the specifications in Table 6 without subject dummies, the positive effect of a
rival’s success probability on expectations (i.e., the effect of player j’s probability pj on
player i’s expectations) is stronger than the effect of own-success probability pA (p < 0.01).
This pattern refutes rational higher-order belief formation, and we therefore fail to reject
the null from Hypothesis 7.
Result 7 suggests that players’ expectations about their rival’s intentions are incon-
sistent with rational static belief formation of higher order. We next study dynamic belief
formation (i.e., updating) of the first order. We first consider a player’s updating of posterior
beliefs (i.e., γm,t) within a match and study the evolution of a player i’s expectations about
player j’s intentions as their active match continues (Result 8). We then present results
on a player’s updating of prior beliefs (i.e., γm,1) across matches. We focus on a player’s
experience in earlier matches (with other rivals) and discuss the effect of that experience on
a player’s actions and beliefs (Result 9).
Result 8. A player’s expectations about a rival’s intentions increase across the length of
the interaction.
This result is consistent with the updating of posterior beliefs (about the other
player’s intentions through its type) within a given match m. In Table 6, we show the
effect of the number of rounds played on player i’s expectations σ˜j in any t of that match.
Given that player j has shared in Round t− 1, player i updates her posterior beliefs γm,t in
Round t and is more optimistic about player j’s intentions in t+ 1. The result continues to
hold when we add subject i fixed effects to the specifications.
One implication of Result 8 is that the history of a match has an effect on a player’s
decision to share through her expectations of her rival’s intentions. This confirms our earlier
approach for Results 1 through 6 in which we restricted our analysis to player A’s decision
and expectations in Round 1. We take the same approach for our last result below. For
Result 9, we turn to a player’s updating of prior beliefs (γm,1) across matches. We consider
the effect of past experience on a player’s behavior and examine how past experience (in
earlier matches) affects that player’s beliefs about her rival’s intentions.
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Result 9. Negative past experience (both self-inflicted and by a rival) reduces a player’s
willingness to share new information.
In Table 7, we present results from probit regressions. The dependent variable is
equal to 1 if player A shares in Round 1 and equal to zero otherwise. We use model (V)
from Table 4 and capture past experience using two dummy variables. Other Terminated is
equal to 1 if player A in a previous match had a rival (either as player A or as player B) who
terminated that specific match by choice. Likewise, Own Terminated is equal to 1 if player
A terminated a previous match by choice, either as player A or as player B. In models (IV)
through (IX) of Table 7, we use the subsample of players A who vary their decisions across
matches. We find that the effects of our reciprocity variables pB and σ˜B, as well as pA, are
robust in models (I), (II), and (III) (i.e., the full sample) to the inclusion of past experience.
The effects of Other Terminated and Own Terminated suggest that past experience
plays an important role for player A’s decision to share. For example, in model (I), if player
A in an earlier match faced a rival who terminated the match by concealing an idea, then
player A is 8.4 percentage points less likely to share in Round 1 of the given match.30
In model (II), if player A herself terminated by choice in an earlier match, then player
A is 26.3 percentage points less likely to share in Round 1 of the given match. One possible
explanation for this result is that a player’s past action in fact captures the player’s own
type and thus her propensity to conceal instead of to share an idea. Models (VII) and (IX),
in which we control for subject-fixed effects, support this explanation. The effects of Own
Terminated in the models without the subject-fixed effects are stronger than in the models
with the fixed effects.31 If Own Terminated were to capture only a subject-fixed effect, then
the marginal effects would be nil in these specifications. However, we still obtain a significant
effect of Own Terminated in model (IX). A possible explanation for this is a player revising
her own prior beliefs about the rival’s type through an effect analogous to “self-projection”
in which a subject “project[s] her known behavior to guess others’ behavior” (Le´vy-Garboua
30The unconditional mean of player A sharing in Round 1 is 72.0% (for the full sample) and 57.4% (for
the sample with match-variant behavior in models (IV) through (IX)). The effect of Other Terminated in the
models with the reduced sample is stronger because the sample includes only player As who have changed
behavior at some point during the experiment.
31To allow for direct comparison, we use the reduced sample in models (IV), (V), and (VI) without the
subject-fixed effects.
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et al., 2006:574). This means that, when player A observes herself concealing an idea, the
general incentives of sharing and concealing become more salient, resulting in less optimistic
expectations about player B’s intentions in a given match.
We argue that past experience enters a player’s decision to share information through
her expectations of the other player’s intentions. Controlling for player i fixed effects in
models (IV) and (V) of Table 6, we indeed see a negative effect of Other Terminated on
player i’s beliefs σ˜j. Moreover, the positive interaction effect in model (V) suggests that the
two types of past experience (self-inflicted and by the rival) are not cumulative. The effect
of Other Terminated is stronger when player i herself has not terminated an earlier match.
Similarly, player i adjusts her expectations of player j’s behavior downward in response to
Own Terminated only if she has not already seen a rival terminate a match.
The negative effect of Other Terminated on a player’s expectations about her rival
is consistent with updating beliefs γ¯m−1 about the rival’s type—as formally introduced
above. A negative past experience makes the player more pessimistic about the pool of
possible future rivals. In the Online Appendix, we further present results for the effect of
past experience separately for early and late matches. We predict that the negative effect
of Other Terminated on a player’s beliefs is weaker as the number of completed matches
increases. Indeed, our estimation results for the late-match sample suggest such a null
effect.
5 Concluding Remarks
Competitors frequently share information with others in the hopes of receiving new infor-
mation in return. This type of (often informal) information exchange has been documented
in academia, finance, and numerous other industries. A number of studies have argued that
individuals and firms are more likely to share information when the costs of sharing (“cur-
rent loss of competitiveness”) are offset by its future benefits (“potential future reciprocity”)
(Ha¨ussler et al., 2014).
We experimentally test whether a feedback loop that captures this tradeoff can shed
light on the role of two central components of an individual’s or a firm’s expectations of
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reciprocity: a recipient’s ability to share new information and a recipient’s intention to share
new information. We use an indeterminate-horizon centipede game to establish a feedback
loop in the laboratory and find that an individual’s expectations about a recipient’s intent
to reciprocate are a more important determinant for the exchange of information than the
recipient’s ability to share. We further show that prior negative experience (in episodes of
information exchange) lingers and has a negative effect on individuals’ and firms’ incentives
to initiate and maintain such exchange in the future.
The basic tradeoff that individuals face when deciding to share private information
applies to both competitors across organizations and team members within organizations.
Thus, our results inform the literature on collective invention (Allen, 1983; Powell and
Giannella, 2010) and innovation networks (Schilling and Phelps, 2007; von Hippel, 2007),
as well as suggest implications for the design of formal and informal platforms of knowledge
exchange. We find that reducing the strategic uncertainty about the behavior of linked
members in one’s network is more important for the diffusion of knowledge than reducing the
environmental uncertainty about other members’ productive potential.32 This means that
the presence of reliable members is more conducive to a sustainable information exchange
than the presence of members with high productive potential.
The implications of our results are consistent with observed practice in many inno-
vation-focused organizations. For instance, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), a
standard-development body that develops, maintains, and promotes technology standards
and protocols that are the foundation of the internet, conducts a large part of its development
work remotely via email listservs. But, importantly, it also organizes three annual meetings
where contributors meet in person. The atmosphere has been described as fun and more
social than at other standards bodies or computer industry conferences (Hoffman, 2018).
Because the IETF has no formal membership requirements, these face-to-face meetings are
a way for the organization to facilitate the building of stronger ties among its contributors
and thus foster better development.
32A player with strong links is more likely to expect another node to reciprocate with new information
(implying higher expectations of the intention to share). Conversely, a node with more links is more likely
to face a node that is able to generate new information to share (implying higher expectations of the ability
to share).
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Appendix
A Model: Extended Presentation with Formal Proofs
We first summarize the formal results in Propositions A.1 through A.4 and then provide our
formal predictions of the model.
A.1 Pure-Strategy and Mixed-Strategy Equilibria
We can now summarize the pure-strategy equilibria of the game of word-of-mouth commu-
nication as follows.
Proposition A.1 (Equilibria in Pure Strategies). Suppose a player i, believing its rival
player j will share an idea with certainty so that σ˜j = 1, has non-negative net benefits from
sharing, φ˜i(1) ≥ 0. The game of word-of-mouth communication has two pure-strategy Nash
equilibria: (1) both players never share an idea and (2) both players always share a newly
generated idea.
Proof. We can rewrite the sharing condition (4) (for a given σ˜j) as follows:
σ˜j ≥ θ
(1− θ + βpi) βpj . (A.1)
This condition defines player i’s best response function, si : [0, 1] → {share, conceal}. If
player j is expected to share with sufficiently high probability, that means, if σ˜j is sufficiently
high, then player i will share. Conversely, if player i expects player j to share a newly
generated idea with low probability, then player i will in return choose to conceal her idea
and end the conversation:
si(σ˜j) =

share if σ˜j ≥ θ
(1− θ + βpi) βpj
conceal if σ˜j <
θ
(1− θ + βpi) βpj .
(A.2)
To show the claims in the Proposition, first note that, in equilibrium, σ˜j = σj. Recall
that we assume time-invariant strategies σi for i = A,B.
1. Suppose player j always conceals and σj = 0. Then φ˜i(0) = −µθ < 0 and player i’s
sharing condition (4) is violated in all t. As a result, σi = 0. For σi = 0, player j’s
sharing condition is violated in all t because φ˜j(0) = −µθ < 0 so that σj = 0, inducing
player i to conceal in all t.
2. This proof immediately follows from Stein (2008). In order for a player i to share,
her necessary condition φ˜i(σ˜j) ≥ 0 must be satisfied, given player j’s strategy σj (and
player i’s beliefs thereof). We first show that if the condition is satisfied for σi = 1 for
both i = A,B, then both players always share a newly generated idea. We then show
that, if at least one of them is violated for σi = 1, neither player i nor player j will
ever share a newly generated idea.
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- First, observe that if both players always share and σi = σj = 1, then φi :=
φ˜i(1) ≥ 0 for i = A,B. If φi ≥ 0 and player i anticipates (in equilibrium) that
player j continues in all t′ > t so that σj = 1, then player i continues in any
t because her necessary condition φi ≥ 0 holds. Then σi = 1. If φj ≥ 0 and
player j anticipates (as player i’s best response to σj) that player i continues in
all t′ > t so that σi = 1, then player j continues in any t because her necessary
condition φj ≥ 0 holds. Then σj = 1.
- Now, suppose that φj ≥ 0 but φi < 0. This implies that φ˜i(1) < 0, and φ˜i(σj) < 0
for all σj because φ˜i(σj) increases in σj (see the proof of Proposition A.2 below).
This means that for any strategy σj, player i conceals an idea in t. Anticipating
this, player j expects in t − 1 payoffs of sharej,t−1 = µ (1− θ) (1− βt−1) when
she shares and concealt−1 = µ [(1− βt−1)− θ (1− βt−2)] when she conceals. She
decides to conceal because sharej,t−1 < concealt−1 as 1−βt−1 > 1−βt−2. Because
player i conceals in any t, player j will respond by concealing in any t− 1. The
game therefore unravels and player A conceals in t = 1. The analogous argument
applies to the case of φi ≥ 0 but φj < 0. Q.E.D.
In Proposition A.1, we characterize two pure-strategy equilibria. The game also has
a mixed-strategy equilibrium. We characterize the equilibrium in the following proposition:
Proposition A.2 (Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies). Let φ˜i(1) ≥ 0 for i = A,B. The
communication game has a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which player i = A,B, i 6= j,
shares newly arrived ideas with probability
σ∗i =
θ
(1− θ + βpj) βpi . (A.3)
Proof. In equilibrium, a player’s expectations about the rival’s strategy are correct, σ˜j =
σj. Moreover, in a mixed-strategy equilibrium, player i chooses a mixed strategy if she is
indifferent between share and conceal. By the expression in (A.2), player i is indifferent if
σ˜j = σj =
θ
(1−θ+βpi)βpj , and therefore indifferent between the pure actions and any mixture
σi ∈ [0, 1]. If σi = θ(1−θ+βpj)βpi , then player j is indifferent and willing to play a strategy σj
as above. Q.E.D.
This mixed-strategy equilibrium is payoff-dominated by the sharing equilibrium in
Proposition A.1, and it payoff-dominates the nonsharing equilibrium in that proposition.
The mixed strategies are time-invariant. We calculate the expected duration of our game of
word-of-mouth communication and summarize in the following proposition.
Proposition A.3. The expected duration of word-of-mouth communication is
1 +
σApB
1− σAσBpApB .
It is finite if σi and pi such that σAσBpApB < 1. The effect of pB on this expected duration
is stronger than the effect of pA if, and only if, σi and pB such that σAσBpB < 1.
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Proof. To determine the expected duration of communication, we determine the probabilities
δt that the game ends in a stage t.
- The game ends in Round 1 when (i) player A conceals or (ii) when player A shares
and player B fails. The probability of (i) or (ii) is
δ1 = 1− σA + σA (1− pB) = 1− σApB.
- The game ends in Round 2 when (i) player A shares, player B is successful, and player
B conceals; or (ii) player A shares, player B is successful, player B shares, and player
A fails. The probability of (i) or (ii) is
δ2 = σApB (1− σB) + σApBσB (1− pA)
= σApB (1− σBpA) .
- The game ends in Round 3 when (i) player A shares, player B is successful, player B
shares, player A is successful, and player A conceals; or (ii) player A shares, player
B is successful, player B shares, player A is successful, player A shares, and player B
fails. The probability of (i) or (ii) is
δ3 = σApBσBpA (1− σA) + σApBσBpAσA (1− pB)
= σApBσBpA (1− σApB) .
- The probability that the game ends in Round 4 is δ4 = (σApB)
2 σBpA (1− σBpA); the
probability that the game ends in Round 5 is δ5 = (σApB)
2 (σBpA)
2 (1− σApB); the
probability that the game ends in Round 6 is δ6 = (σApB)
3 (σBpA)
2 (1− σBpA); the
probability that the game ends in Round 7 is δ7 = (σApB)
3 (σBpA)
3 (1− σApB); and
so forth.
The expected duration of word-of-mouth communication (i.e., the expected round in which
it ends) is
D =
∞∑
q=0
δq+1 (q + 1)
=
∞∑
q=0
(σApB)
q (σBpA)
q [(1− σApB) (1 + q) + σApB (1− σBpA) (2 + q)]
= 1 +
σApB
1− σAσBpApB . (A.4)
The derivative of the last expression, D, with respect to pA is
∂D
∂pA
=
p2Bσ
2
AσB
(1− σAσBpApB)2
> 0.
The derivative of D with respect to pB is
∂D
∂pB
=
σA
(1− σAσBpApB)2
> 0.
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At last,
∂D
∂pB
>
∂D
∂pA
⇐⇒ σAσBp2B < 1, (A.5)
implying that the effect of player B’s success probability is stronger than player A’s success
probability if and only if σi and pi such that σAσBpB < 1 Q.E.D.
Our predictions of the model discussed in the main text use payoff-dominance as
criterion for equilibrium selection when both a sharing and nonsharing equilibrium exist
(for φ˜i). The following proposition summarizes the comparative statics of φ˜i ≥ 0 with
respect to our parameters of interest.
Proposition A.4 (Comparative Statics). Suppose a sharing equilibrium with φ˜i(1) ≥ 0 for
i = A,B exists. Player i’s net benefits from sharing φ˜i have the following properties: (1) φ˜i
is increasing in pj, σ˜j, and pij = pjσ˜j, (2) φ˜i is increasing in pi, and (3) the marginal effect
of pj on φ˜i is larger than the effect of pj for sufficiently large values of pi.
Proof. The first derivatives of φ˜i with respect to pij, pj, and σ˜j are
∂φ˜i
∂pj
=
β (1 + βpi) σ˜j
(1 + βσ˜jpj)
2 > 0,
∂φ˜i
∂σ˜j
=
β (1 + βpi) pj
(1 + βσ˜jpj)
2 > 0, and
∂φ˜i
∂pi
=
β2σ˜jpj
1 + βσjpj
> 0.
From the cross-probability effect of pj and the own-probability effect of pi, we can see that
∂φ˜i
∂pj
>
∂φ˜i
∂pi
⇐⇒ 1 + βpi
1 + βpjσ˜j
> βpj. (A.6)
This means that the effect of player j’s ability pj is stronger than the effect of player i’s own
ability pi if pi is not too low. Q.E.D.
A.2 Predictions from the Model
For our first prediction, we expect the parties to play the sharing strategy (and thus co-
ordinate on the payoff-dominant sharing equilibrium) more often when the net benefits of
sharing φ˜i are higher.
Prediction 1. Players are expected to share and coordinate on the sharing equilibrium more
often when the net benefits from sharing φ˜i are higher. [Hypothesis 1]
By our payoff-dominance argument, anything that relaxes the condition in equa-
tion (4) increases the net benefits from sharing and will induce players to choose the sharing
strategy more often.
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Prediction 2. Player i is expected to share a new idea more often when she expects to
receive information in return with higher probability. [Hypotheses 2 and 3]
Unless pj = σ˜j, we expect the two components of reciprocity (ability and expected
intentions) to have different effects on player i’s behavior. More specifically, if pj < σ˜j, the
effect of ability pj is stronger than that of expected intentions σ˜j. If, instead, pj > σ˜j, this
pattern is reversed.33 Moreover, the larger the difference between pj and σ˜j (or the larger
their ratio pj/σ˜j), the bigger this differential effect—where the difference of marginal effects
of pj and σ˜j is positive for pj/σ˜j < 1 and negative if pj/σ˜j > 1. The relative impact of
environmental uncertainty (captured by pj) and strategic uncertainty (captured by σ˜j) on
player i’s behavior is thus determined by how much they each contribute to the probability
of reciprocity. This gives rise to our third prediction.
Prediction 3. The difference of the marginal effects of pj and σ˜j on player i’s willingness
to share is negative if pj/σ˜j < 1, positive if pj/σ˜j > 1, and zero otherwise. [Hypothesis 4]
For our next prediction, recall that, in the symmetric baseline model, a player’s and
a rival’s abilities have the same effect on player i’s decision to share (because pi = pj = p).
We can disentangle one from the other. We predict that a player’s own ability to send
information in t+ 2 has a positive effect on her decision to send information in t.
Prediction 4. Holding σ˜j constant, player i’s willingness to share increases with her own
ability, pi. [Hypothesis 5]
Holding expectations σ˜j constant, a player’s own ability pi is expected to be weaker
than the effect of the other player’s cross ability. This is because the cross-ability effect is
immediate (in t+ 1), whereas the own-ability effect is delayed (in t+ 2).
Prediction 5. Holding σ˜j constant, player i’s own ability pi has a weaker effect on her
decision to share than player j’s cross ability pj. [Hypothesis 6]
The effect of own ability pi on player i’s decision to share is two-fold. First, a player’s
own ability increases the value of ongoing information exchange because, with a higher pi,
the exchange is expected to last longer and therefore more ideas are generated and shared.
We refer to this effect as direct effect. Second, an indirect effect of own ability on the player’s
decision acts through her expectations of the other player’s intentions. In Prediction 2, we
predict that pj has a positive effect on player i’s decision. We therefore expect a positive
effect of pi on player j’s decision. Player i, forming beliefs about player j’s intentions to
share, will anticipate this effect. As a consequence, a player’s own ability is expected to
have a positive effect on her expectations of player j’s intentions, and pi has thus an indirect
or second-order effect on her decision to share.
33We can see this from comparative statics. The first derivative of φ˜i(σ˜j) with respect to pj is
dφ˜i
dpj
=
(1+βpi)βσ˜j
(1+βpij)
2 . The first derivative of φ˜i(σ˜j) with respect to σ˜j is
dφ˜i
dσ˜j
=
(1+βpi)βpj
(1+βpij)
2 . We have
dφ˜i
dpj
> dφ˜idσ˜j if, and
only if, pj < σ˜j .
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Prediction 6. Player i’s own ability, pi, has a stronger effect on her expectations about
player j’s intentions than player j’s cross ability, pj. [Hypothesis 7]
These predictions address our three research questions as laid out in the introduction.
We translate these predictions into testable hypotheses in Section 3 and present answers to
our questions in Section 4.
B Robustness Results
Our results for the expectations of reciprocity are robust to a set variables capturing trust,
fairness, and personal connections, all of which have been associated with increased coop-
erative or pro-social behavior. We report these results in Table A.1. We provide detailed
descriptions and summary statistics for these control variables in Table A.2.
B.1 Personal Connections
Indicators of personal connections or social bonds (i.e., the number of people a participant
recognizes in the experimental session, Acquaintances, and the number of people in the
session a participant considers friends, Friends34) do not affect our results for the probability
of reciprocity (pB and σ˜B) or a player’s own-success probability. Moreover, only Friends
exhibits a statistically significant effect on player A’s sharing in Round 1.
A small number of papers have presented results that suggest that social interactions
and peer effects influence stock market participation (Hong et al., 2004) or provide a mech-
anism through which asset prices incorporate private information (Cohen et al., 2008). To
understand how personal connections or social bonds affect word-of-mouth communication,
we need to draw a distinction between the effect at the extensive margin and at the inten-
sive margin. The former describes how players choose to form connections or a network
with which to share private information (selection). The latter captures the effect on the
willingness to share when a connection or network has already been formed. We find that,
given an exchange network (taking the extensive margin as given), the presence of personal
connections or social bonds plays little to no role in the player’s decision to share an idea.
Our results are complementary to Crawford et al. (2017) who also take a social network as
given and observe word-of-mouth communication at the intensive margin.
34Recall that, by the design of the experiment, subjects did not know with whom they had been grouped.
The answers to the above questions, therefore, apply to the session (two groups) rather than to the subject’s
group.
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B.2 Fairness and Trustworthiness
The experimental literature in economics has shown that considerations of fairness of others
and trust toward others play an important role in how people make decisions.35 In order to
see the effect of fairness and trust on a player’s decision to share a new idea, we control for two
variables obtained in an exit survey. First, we survey the participants’ perceptions of other
people’s fairness, Fairness; second, we ask for participants’ perceptions of other people’s
trustworthiness, Trustworthiness. Again, our main results are robust to the inclusion of
these indicators. Moreover, subjects’ views of fairness and trustworthiness do not exhibit
statistically significant effects on player A’s sharing in Round 1. We therefore do not find
evidence for an effect of general perceptions of fairness and trustworthiness of others on a
player’s decision to share private information.
B.3 Risk Aversion
We further find that risk aversion does not drive our main results because the marginal effect
of Risk Aversion on player A’s sharing behavior is not statistically significantly different from
zero. We derive our risk-aversion measure from the Holt and Laury (2002) risk-preference
tasks; our numbers are consistent with those in Holt and Laury (2002).36 We take a conser-
vative approach, and for our analyses—utilizing the Holt-Laury risk-preference measure in
models (VI) through (VIII)—we use only observations from matches with subjects making
consistent choices.
35For fairness, see, for instance, Fehr et al. (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), or Fehr and Schmidt (2006).
In the context of information exchange, Ga¨chter et al. (2010) argue that knowledge sharing in private-
collective innovation (i.e., privately funded public goods innovation) is affected by fairness. For trust, see,
for instance, Berg et al. (1995) or Ortmann et al. (2000).
36Most subjects are risk averse and made choices between 5, 6, and 7 in the risk-aversion elicitation task.
This implies risk-aversion coefficients of 0.15 and 0.97 in terms of a CARA expected utility framework.
About 22% of the subjects exhibit inconsistent choices (selecting back and forth between lottery A and
lottery B as the probability of the higher payoff increased).
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Table A.2: Definitions and Summary Statistics of Explanatory Variables
Definitions for round-level data
Own success pi Player i’s success probability (i.e., the probability of generating a new idea
conditional on player j having shared an idea in the previous round). Subjects
know their own and their rival’s success probabilities.
Cross success pj Player j’s success probability (i.e., the probability of generating a new idea
conditional on player i having shared an idea in the previous round). Subjects
know their own and their rival’s success probabilities.
Expected intentions σ˜j Player i’s expectations that player j will share a newly generated idea in the
next round.
Round Round number of a given match.
Other Terminated Dummy variable = 1 if player i has previously had a rival who terminated
the match by choice either as player A (in odd rounds) or player B (in even
rounds). By definition, Other Terminated = 0 for the first match.
Own Terminated Dummy variable = 1 if player i has previously terminated a match by choice
either as a player A (in odd rounds) or player B (in even rounds). By definition,
Own Terminated = 0 for the first match.
Definitions for subject-level data
Acquaintances Number of people each participant recognized in the experimental session (Sur-
vey question: “How many people in this session do you recognize?”).
Friends Number of a participant’s friends that are participating in the same session
(Survey question: “How many would you consider friends?”).
Fairness Participant’s perception of other people’s fairness with higher values indicating
more fairness (Survey question: “Do you think that most people would try to
take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?” This
question is adapted from the World Values Survey. The questionnaire can be
found at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp.).
Trustworthiness Participant’s perception of other people’s trustworthiness with higher values
indicating higher levels of trust (Survey question: “Generally speaking, would
you say that most people can be trusted, or that you need to be very careful
in dealing with people?” This question is adapted from the World Values Sur-
vey. The questionnaire can be found at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/
WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp.).
Risk Aversion Risk aversion category by the Holt and Laury (2002) risk preference task, rang-
ing from 1 to 10 with higher numbers reflecting higher degrees of risk aversion.
Risk-aversion results are consistent with the results from Holt and Laury (2002)
in that most subjects are risk averse and choose between 5 (21.3%), 6 (14.9%),
and 7 (30.3%) in the risk-aversion elicitation task. This implies risk-aversion
coefficients of 0.15 and 0.97 in terms of a CARA expected utility framework.
Subjects that exhibit inconsistent behavior (selecting back and forth between
lottery A and lottery B as the probability of the higher payoff increased), are
dropped from the sample when Holt-Laury is used as independent variable.
Summary Statistics
N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Own success pi (for Round 1) 578 68.27 19.94 50 90
Cross success pj (for Round 1) 578 68.27 19.94 50 90
Expected intentions σ˜j (for Round 1) 578 60.70 30.10 0 100
Round 1574 3.67 3.77 1 22
Other Terminated 1574 0.72 0.45 0 1
Own Terminated 1574 0.53 0.50 0 1
Acquaintances 100 2.92 2.36 0 12
Friends 100 1.81 2.64 0 12
Fairness 100 4.85 2.36 1 10
Trustworthiness 100 5.45 2.61 1 10
Risk Aversion 82 6.95 1.51 3 10
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C Means Tests Results for Hypotheses 2, 3, 5, and 6
Table A.3: Average Treatment Effects (Hypotheses 2, 5, and 6)
In the top portion of the table, we report the average level of sharing in Round 1 by player A for treatments High, Low,
Low-High, and High-Low. In the bottom portion of the table, we report the results of one-tailed unpaired two-sample t-tests
of the pair-wise difference of the mean of sharing (in Round 1 by player A) for Hypotheses 2, 5, and 6. We provide results for the
full sample, as well as by three groups of player A’s expectations σ˜B about B’s sharing in Round 2: “Low” for σ˜B ∈ [0%, 33%],
“Medium” for σ˜B ∈ (33%, 66%], and “High” for σ˜B ∈ (66%, 100%]. The prediction is a positive average treatment effect on
sharing (e.g., Sharing (Round 1) in High > Sharing (Round 1) in High-Low). We report the average treatment effects with
standard errors in parentheses.
Sharing in Round 1 (Player A)
Treatment Mean (s.e.) N
High (pA = 90%, pB = 90%) 0.8939 (0.026) 132
Low (pA = 50%, pB = 50%) 0.5934 (0.036) 182
Low-High (pA = 50%, pB = 90%) 0.8106 (0.034) 132
High-Low (pA = 90%, pB = 50%) 0.6287 (0.042) 132
Differences: Unpaired two-sample t-test
Prediction Average treatment effect on sharing (s.e.)
by player A’s expectations subgroup
Full Low Medium High
Hypothesis 2: Positive effect of cross success probability
High > High-Low 0.2651∗∗∗ -0.0051 0.0631 0.1849∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.145) (0.087) (0.051)
Low-High > Low 0.2171∗∗∗ 0.3882∗∗∗ 0.1247∗ 0.1012∗
(0.051) (0.123) (0.082) (0.061)
Hypothesis 5: Positive effect of own-success probability
High > Low-High 0.0833∗ -0.3882∗∗ 0.1209 0.0520∗
(0.043) (0.190) (0.094) (0.036)
High-Low > Low 0.0353 0.0051 0.1825∗∗ -0.0316
(0.055) (0.088) (0.079) (0.082)
Hypothesis 6: Effect of cross-success probability is stronger than of own-success probability
Low-High > High-Low 0.1818∗∗∗ 0.3831∗∗∗ -0.0578 0.1328∗∗
(0.054) (0.128) (0.077) (0.070)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.4: Average Treatment Effects (Hypothesis 3)
We report the results of one-tailed unpaired two-sample t-tests of the pair-wise difference of mean sharing (in Round 1 by
player A) between different belief groups (“Low”, “Medium”, and “High”) for treatments High, Low, Low-High, and High-
Low. The three groups of player A’s beliefs σ˜B about B’s sharing in Round 2 are “Low” for σ˜B ∈ [0%, 33%], “Medium” for
σ˜B ∈ (33%, 66%], and “High” for σ˜B ∈ (66%, 100%]. The prediction is a positive average treatment effect on sharing between
belief groups (e.g., mean of sharing in “Medium” > mean of sharing in “Low”). We report the average treatment effects (ATE)
with standard errors in parentheses.
Treatment Belief Comparison
group Sharing in Round 1 Prediction across expectation groups
Mean (s.e.) N ATE (s.e.)
Low 0.2000 (0.133) 10
High Medium 0.8846 (0.063) 26 Medium > Low 0.6846 ∗∗∗ (0.131)
High 0.9687 (0.017) 96 High > Medium 0.0841 ∗∗ (0.047)
Low 0.2000 (0.060) 45
Low Medium 0.6388 (0.057) 72 Medium > Low 0.4388 ∗∗∗ (0.086)
High 0.8153 (0.048) 65 High > Medium 0.1764 ∗∗ (0.075)
Low 0.5882 (0.123) 17
Low-High Medium 0.7636 (0.057) 55 Medium > Low 0.1754 ∗ (0.124)
High 0.9166 (0.035) 60 High > Medium 0.1530 ∗∗ (0.066)
Low 0.2051 (0.065) 39
High-Low Medium 0.8214 (0.051) 56 Medium > Low 0.6163 ∗∗∗ (0.082)
High 0.7837 (0.068) 37 High > Medium -0.0376 (0.084)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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